TORT-IMMUNITY-PRIVATE

WATER COMPANY HELD LIABLE FOR

NEGLIGENT FAILURE TO PROVIDE

SUFFICIENT WATER PRES-

SURE FOR FIGHTING FIRES TO EXTENT CLAIMS ARE UNDERIN-

SURED OR UNINSURED-Weinberg

v. Dinger, 106 N.J. 469, 524

A.2d 366 (1987).
Though firmly entrenched in English common law, in the
United States the doctrine of tort immunity is slowly eroding
through judicial and legislative channels.' Courts are becoming
more concerned with fairness and public policy considerations
than with upholding antiquated common law tort immunities.2
Traditionally, municipal corporations enjoyed a broad spectrum
of immunity.' In recent years, however, the trend seems to be
the abolition of the immunities either in whole or part.4
Cause for concern was spurned with the transformation of
the immunity doctrine.' Disputes emerged regarding the issue of
whether the judiciary or the legislature should abrogate existing
immunities.' Recently, the New Jersey Supreme Court, in WeinSee W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON
THE LAW OF TORTS § 131, at 1052 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON].
2 See, e.g., Kelley v. Gwinnel, 96 N.J. 538, 476 A.2d 1219 (1984); Rappaport v.
Nichols, 31 N.J. 188, 156 A.2d 1 (1959); Wytupeck v. Camden, 25 N.J. 450, 136
A.2d 887 (1957).
'3 See Note, Government Liability in Tort, 34 YALE L.J. 1, 1 (1924). Historically,
Anglo-American law required the citizen to bear the burdens of the government's
administrative errors Id. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895C comment b (1977) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT].
A local government entity has been regarded by the law as having a
unique dual character, which in the past has considerably affected its
liabilitv in tort. On the one hand it is a subdivision of the State, endowed with governmental and political powers, and charged with governmental functions and responsibilities. On the other hand it is a
corporate body, capable of much the same acts as a private corporation,
and having much the same special and local interests and relations, not
shared bv the State at large .... Insofar as the local government represented the State, in its governmental, political or public capacity, it
shared the same immunity of the State from liability in tort.
Id.
4 See RsFTATEMENT, supra note 3, ch. 45A introductory note. See also PROSSER &
KEETON, supra note 1,§§ 131-135 (government immunity, public officer immunity,
charitable immunity, infant immunity and immunity for the insane have been
largely restricted or abolished).
5 See PROSSER & KEETON, supba note I, § 131, at 1055-56; Comment, Judicial
.Ibrogation of Governmental and Sovereign Immunity: 4. 'ational Trend with a Pennsylvania
Perspective, 78 DICK. L. REV. 365, 386 (1973) (noting that in the absence of statutorv
abrogation, courts should be foreclosed from interfering with the immunity
doctrines).
6 PROSSER & KEETON, supra note I,§ 131, at 1055; Comment, supra, note 5, at
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berg v. Dinger,7 narrowed the framework of tort immunity despite
existing statutory provisions.' The court held that private water
companies were not immune from liability for losses caused by
their negligent failure to maintain sufficient water pressure for
fighting fires, except with regard to fire insurance companies'
subrogation claims:
Penns Grove Water Company (Penns Grove) operated pursuant to a filed tariff and in accordance with the rule and regulations set forth by the Board of Public Utility Commissioners
(BPU).' t The tariff provided that Penns Grove adopt the regulations promulgated by the BPU." Penns Grove also was obligated under the tariff to exercise due diligence in all aspects of
service to be performed. '2 Further, the terms of the tariff were to
be incorporated into every service contract entered into by Penns
Grove." Accordingly, Penns Grove engaged in a service contract
with Paul Weinberg which automatically included the BPU's rules
and regulations and the tariff's conditions and terms."
A fire occurred at the Twin Bridge Apartments in Penns
386. A further issue is whether a court's decision to abolish immunity should apply
retrospectively or prospectively. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note I, § 131, at 1055.
Also controversial is whether a restructuring of immunity law "can be achieved
within a stable framework of law." Id. at 1055-56.
7 106 N.J. 469, 524 A.2d 366 (1987).
8 See id. at 492, 524 A.2d at 378.
1) Id. Abrogation of immunity was limited to those situations where the claimants were uninsured or underinsured. Id.
t0 Id. at 472, 524 A.2d at 367.
1 1 Id. at 473, 524 A.2d at 367. Paragraph one of the tariff stated: "Pennsgrove
Water Supply Company, Inc ..... hereby adopted Regulations promulgated by the
Board of Public Utility Commissioners . . . insofar as they may be applicable to
Water Utilities .... ." Id.
12 Id. Paragraph eight of the tariff stated:
The Company will use due diligence at all times to provide continuous service of the character or quality proposed to be supplied but in
case the service shall be interrupted or irregular or defective or fail, the
Company shall be liable and obligated only to use reasonably diligent
efforts in light of the circumstances then existing to restore or correct its
characteristics.

Id.
1: Id. Paragraph ten of the tariff stated: "The standard terms and conditions
contained in this tariff are a part of every contract for service entered into by the
Company and govern all classes of service where applicable ......
Id.
14 Id., 524 A.2d at 367-68. One BPU regulation, entitled "Pressure and volume
of water service," provides: '(a) Each water utility shall supply water service at adequate pressure and volume to the curb, or point of connection with the customer's
service line. (b) Each water utility shall maintain sulicient pressure and volume of
water at all fire hydrants to assure adequate streams for the fighting of fires." N.J.
ADMIN. CODE tit. 14, § 9-2.2 (1985).

1988]

NOTES

957

Grove, NewJersey on November 23, 1980.' 5 Fire fighters, due to
insufficient water pressure from nearby hydrants, were incapable
of extinguishing the blaze."" As a result, the entire building, consisting of twelve apartments, was destroyed.' 7 The property
owner, Paul Weinberg, and residents of the building instituted
suit against Penns Grove for damages suffered as a result of the
fire.' They maintained that there was inadequate water pressure
for fighting fires because Penns Grove negligently failed to maintain, repair and inspect its water system.'19
The trial court granted Penns Grove's motion for summary
judgment and certified it as final."' The appellate division affirmed and concluded that absent an express contractual or statutory duty, a private water company could not be held liable for
negligently failing to provide a sufficient supply of water. 2 ' The
New Jersey Supreme Court reversed the appellate division decision, holding that private water companies were liable in tort for
failing to provide sufficient water pressure for fighting fires, except in cases concerning subrogation claims maintained by fire
22
insurance companies.
At common law, it was well-established that, absent a contractual or statutory provision, a private water company had no
duty to provide sufficient water pressure for combatting fires. 3
15 lleinberg,

106 N.J. at 472, 524 A.2d at 367.

1 i Id.
17

Id.

18 Weinberg v. Penns Grove Water Co., 216 N.J. Super. 409, 410, 524 A.2d 403,

403 (App. Div. 1984), rev d, 106 N.J. 469, 524 A.2d 366 (1987).
'9 lI'einbeig, 106 N.J. at 472, 524 A.2d at 367. Penns Grove was the private water
company responsible for installing and maintaining the water mains and fire hydrants in the municipality. Id.
20
'emberg, 216 N.J. Super. at 411-12, 524 A.2d at 404.
21 See id. at 412-13, 524 A.2d at 405.
22 11'einberg, 106 N.J. at 492-93, 524 A.2d 378. The supreme court remanded for
a full trial, which was to include a determination regarding whether the case involved subrogation claims and whether plaintiffs have been compensated for their
losses. Id. at 496 & n.8, 524 A.2d at 380 & n.8. The court instructed: "To the
extent that plaintifs' claims are identified as subrogation claims by fire-insurance
carriers, such claims should be dismissed unless the claimants are prepared to
prove that increases in water company insurance costs because of liability for such
subrogation claims would be substantially offset by decreases in fire-insurance premiums." Id. at 496 n.8, 524 A.2d at 380 n.8. In May 1987, the plaintiffs unsuccessfully petitioned the New Jersey Supreme Court for rehearing.
231 See, e.g., Reimann v. Monmouth Consol. Water Co., 9 N.J. 134, 87 A.2d 325
(1952) (denying recovery against water company for failure to supply sufficient
water pressure for fire fighting in the absence of a contract between water company
and individual); Atlas Finishing Co. v. Hackensack Water Co., 10 N.J. Misc. 1197,
163 A. 20 (N.J. 1932) (determining there is no implied contract between a customer
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The NewJersey Supreme Court first addressed the issue of a private water company's duty to provide water in Olmsted v. Proprietors of the Morris Aqueduct.24 In Olmsted, the proprietors of the
Morris Aqueduct sought to expand their facilities for supplying
water to Morristown by diverting certain streams and springs.2 5
The waters of these streams and springs flowed through the
lands owned by Olmsted and others. 26 The expansion was necessary to provide water to the rapidly growing number of inhabitants in Morristown. 27 Olmsted objected to the unconstitutional
taking of water from his lands and mill. 28 He requested the appointment of three commissioners to assess the ensuing damages
and to ascertain his rightful compensation. 9
The court held that a water company could exercise the right
of eminent domain to further the public interest.3" Noting that
and a water company that the water company will supply adequate water pressure
for extinguishing fires); Baum v. Somerville Water Co., 84 N.J.L. 611, 87 A. 140
(N.J. 1913) (holding that a water company is not liable for inadequate water pressure where no contractual relationship existed between plaintiff and water company); Hall v. Passaic Water Co., 83 N.J.L. 771, 85 A. 349 (N.J. 1912) (denying
recovery to a mill for fire loss caused by insufficient water supply where contractual
relation existed between water company and city but not between the mill and the
water company).
24 46 N.J.L. 495 (N.J. 1884).
25 Id. The waters of "Sand Spring" were on the lands owned by the proprietors
of the Morris Aqueduct and were to be diverted. Id. Also, Mills Baily Brook, a
rivulet crossing the road leading from Morristown to Basking Ridge and flowing
down to the lands owned by Olmsted and occupied by his tenants, was to be diverted. Id. at 495-96.
26 Id. at 496. Olmsted was the owner of 116 acres of land and a grist-mill. Id.
William Stull and Frederick Stull were tenants of Olmsted and operated the gristmill. Id.
27 Id. at 500-01. The court noted:
The object is to furnish water to the people of Morristown. Morristown
is a growing municipality, covering a large extent of territory, and containing about six thousand inhabitants. Improved facilities for rapid
transit have brought the town so near New York that it may almost be
called a suburban town. The number of permanent residents is rapidly
increasing. Spacious houses are multiplying. The population is of such
a character as to demand those conveniences and comforts of life developed by what are termed "modern improvements." To retain such a
population an abundance of pure spring water is essential.
Id.
28 Id. at 496.
29 Id. Olmsted contended that he had a "perpetual right and privilege" to have
the water flow through his lands. Id. He urged that diverting the water away from
his property constituted an unjust taking without compensation. Id. Olmsted
maintained that his land would be damaged and his mill could not operate properly
if the water was diverted. See id.
'0 Id. at 499. The court posited that private rights may be infringed if the public
interest will be benefited. Id. Thus, it concluded that corporate entities are justi-
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the object of the proprietors was to furnish water to a growing
municipality"' and that supplying an abundance of spring water
was essential,3 - the supreme court posited that for a water company to fulfill its public duty, "it must provide water for ordinary
purposes, as well as unexpected contingencies. '3 3 The court asserted: "[I]t is necessary to anticipate the condition of things
which experience teaches will frequently occur, and in time make
provision by increased facilities to supply water abundantly at a
period when it shall be most needed. 3'1 4 It reasoned that the
health and comfort of the people demanded no less. 3 5 It also
asserted that "[w]hen a company undertakes to supply a town
with water the ordinary methods to obtain water to extinguish
fires are abandoned by the people, and under such circumstances
it would be gross negligence [for] the company to permit the
supply of water to be intermitted or diminished to any considera3
ble extent, and thus endanger the property within the town." 6
Thus, even though there was no contract between the water company and its citizens, the court imposed a duty on the water company for policy reasons:"
Six years later, the court elaborated on a private water company's contractual duty to supply water, in Middlesex Water Co. v.
Knappman Whiting Co. " The plaintiff water company entered into
a contract with the defendant, a manufacturing company.3 : 9 Pursuant to the terms of the contract, the water company was to provide water "with a pressure sufficient for fire purposes" for a
period of five years. 4" On May 18, 1898, the principal water main
broke where it crossed a stream and caused unusually low water
fied in taking private property for the purpose of bringing water to towns and cities.
Id. at 499-500.
3 1 Id. at 500. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
32 0msed, 46 N.J.L. at 501.
33 Id. The court stated: "A company that undertakes to supply a city or town
with water does not perform its duty to the public unless it provides, not only for
ordinary seasons, but for long summer droughts. Provision must be made in advance for such contingencies, for when the drought shall come it will be too late to
apply a remedy." Id.
34 Id.
35 Id.

6( Id.
37
18

See id.

64 NJ.L. 240, 45 A. 692 (NJ. 1900).

Id. at 240-41, 45 A. at 692-93.
I"
40 Id. at 241, 45 A. at 693. The water company agreed to furnish water for
drinking, domestic uses and fire fighting, for $600 per year. Id. at 241-42, 45 A. at
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pressure. 4 ' Workers, unable to repair the main immediately because of high tide, were unable to restore normal water pressure
until the afternoon of May 19, 1898.42 The defendant's factory
caught fire on the morning of May 19, and was destroyed.43 The
water company sued the defendant for breach of contract for failure to make subsequent payments for water supplied. 4 4 The defendant counter-claimed for damages sustained as a result of the
water company's failure to supply sufficient water pressure for
45
fire fighting as required by contract.
The court held that the water company was liable to the
manufacturing company, even though the company was not at
fault for its failure to maintain adequate water pressure for fire
prevention. 4" The court concluded that, because the contract
was "clear and unqualified," the contractor was bound to perform unless it was absolutely impossible. 47 The court stated:
"where one of two innocent persons must sustain a loss, the law
casts it upon him who has agreed to sustain it, or, rather,48the law
leaves it where the agreement of the parties has put it."
The court was confronted with a similar issue in Hall v. Passaic Water Co. 4" The plaintiff, a mill owner, entered into a contract for water with the defendant water company." A fire broke
out and the mill was destroyed due to insufficient water pressure."' The water company claimed that the superintendent
never contracted nor had the authority to contract to supply
water for fire purposes .5 Additionally, the water company's contract records contained no other contracts of this type. 5' The
court reasoned that the plaintiff failed to establish that the superintendent had the authority to guarantee a sufficient amount of
41 Id. at 244, 45 A. at 694. The company was notified of the low water pressure
at 11:00 p.m., but did not determine there was a break in a pipe until 4:00 a.m. the
following day. Id.

Id.
4:1 Id. The defendant's loss, after insurance and salvage, was estimated to be
42

$16,889. Id.
44 Id. at 243, 45 A. at 693.
45 Id. at 242, 45 A. at 693.
46 Id. at 254, 45 A. at 697.
47 Id. at 251, 254, 45 A. at 696, 697. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
48 Viddlesex Water Co., 64 N.J.L. at 251, 254, 45 A. at 696, 697. "No distinction
[was] made between accidents that could be foreseen when the contract was entered into and those that could not have been foreseen." Id. at 251, 45 A. at 696.
49 83 N.J.L. 771, 85 A. 349 (N.J. 1912).
5 Id. at 772-73, 85 A. at 349-50.
51 Id. at 772, 85 A. at 350.
52 Id. at 773-74, 85 A. at 350-51.
53 Id. at 775, 85 A. at 351.
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water pressure for fighting fires. 54 Absent authority and an express contractual provision, the court was reluctant to impose liability on the water company. 5 5
The court in Baum v. Somerville Water Co., 513 followed the holdings of Middlesex and Hall." The plaintiff, Michael Baum,
brought an action against the water company to recover for
losses sustained when a fire destroyed his stove factory and warehouse. 5' Both hose and engine companies were dispatched, but
they were not able to extinguish the fire because of insufficient
water pressure. 5 9 The plaintiff contended that the defendant
water company breached its duty to provide a constant supply of
water at reasonable pressure."" The supreme court noted that
there was no contract between the plaintiff and defendant, but
rather, with the defendant and the town."' The court held that
absent a contract between Baum and the water company, the
company could not be held liable for plaintiff's damages. 62 The
court further asserted that neither common law nor statutory
no liability attached in
provision imposed such liability."' Thus,
64
contract.
enforceable
an
of
the absence
Nearly twenty years after the Baum decision, the court reaffirmed its position on water company liability in Atlas FinishingCo.
v. Hackensack Water Co. 5 The plaintiff instituted suit against the
defendant, a public utility operating a water company, sounding
in tort, implied contract and statutory duty arising under the
54 See id. at 774, 85 A. at 350.
55 See id. at 774-75, 85 A. at 350-51.
56

84 N.J.t.. 611, 87 A. 140 (N.J. 1913).

57 See id. at 612-13, 87 A. at 140-4 1.

Id. at 611-12, 87 A. at 140.
Id. at 612, 87 A. at 140. The water company "was incorporated for the purpose of supplying the towns of Somerville and Raritan with water." Id.
") Id. at 612-13, 87 A. at 140-4 1. Baum claimed that the defendant company had
a duty to the citizens of Somerville and Raritan to adequately supply water at a
sufficient pressure for fire fighting. Id.
1 See id.
62 1d. at 615, 87 A. at 141. The court stated: "Ii]n the absence of contract no
liability exists on the part of the defendant for the benefit of the plaintiff." Id. The
court asserted that as neither the common law nor a relevant statutory provision
imposed such liability, it did not exist absent a contract. Id. The court distinguished Viddlesex, because unlike the case at bar, in that case the water company
had entered into a contract with a factory owner whereby the company was to supply the owner with sufficient water pressure for fighting fires. Id. at 612-13, 87 A. at
140. See aLto supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text (discussing Aiddlesex).
63 Baum, 84 N.J.L. at 615, 87 A. at 141.
5.1

5.1

64
65

Id.
10 N.J. Misc. 1197, 163 A. 20 (N.J. 1932).
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Public Utility Act when a fire broke out at the plaintiff's plant and
completely destroyed his building and property." Plaintiff alleged that the fire was uncontrollable due to inadequate water
pressure supplied by the water company.6 7
The court recognized neither a common law nor statutory
duty of a water company to supply water for extinguishing fires. 68
The court asserted that although breach of the Public Utility
Act's provision requiring safe property and adequate service constituted a misdemeanor," ' it did not establish a private cause of
action. The court posited that the central duty of a water company was simply "to furnish water as a commodity." 7 °
The next significant development affecting the potential liability of a water company was marked by the NewJersey Supreme
7
Court's decision in Reimann v. Monmouth Consolidated Water Co.
In Reimann, a fire at a recreation center destroyed the building
and its contents when volunteer firefighters were unable to extinguish the blaze because of insufficient water volume and pres66 Id. at 1197-99, 163 A. at 21-22. The water pipes in the plaintiff's plant were
connected to the defendant's water main. Id. at 1197-98, 163 A. at 21. There were
outlets for discharging water and fire hydrants for extinguishing fires. Id.
67 Id. at 1198, 163 A. at 21.
68 See id. at 1204, 163 A. at 24. The court stated:
In the absence of a statutory mandate imposing liability upon the utility
company in behalf of an individual consumer who has been damaged by
a failure to comply with any such order, the order itself could impose no
such liability. As already stated, our statute imposes no such liability,
and, as enunciated in the decisions last cited above, it will be presumed
that the legislature does not intend by statute to make any change in the
common law beyond what it declares either in express terms or by unmistakable implication.
Id. The court posited that such enormous liability should not be imposed on a
private water company "by mere implication." Id.
69 Id. at 1203, 163 A. at 23. The relevant provision provided: "Nor shall any
public utility as herein defined provide or maintain any service that is unsafe, improper or inadequate." Id.
70 Id. at 1199, 163 A. at 22. The court explained:
The primary business of a water company, so far as private customers are concerned, is to furnish water as a commodity. Keeping this in
mind, and further recognizing that under the law of this state the defendant is a quasi-public corporation engaged in the exercise of a public
use in discharging a public duty which would otherwise devolve upon
the municipality itself, and furnishing water at rates fixed exclusively by
a state agency, it would appear plain that it was never contemplated that
from the simple relation of distributor and consumer, the former undertook to assume liability for failure to furnish water to extinguish fires.
Id. at 1199-1200, 163 A. at 22.
71 9 N.J. 134, 87 A.2d 325 (1952).
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sure.7 2 The plaintiff, the owner and operator of the recreation
center, brought a tort action against the public utility responsible
for supplying the water. 73 A majority of the court, relying on
Baum, determined that absent a specific obligation concerning
water pressure for extinguishing fires, a water company could not
be held liable to a plaintiff for losses sustained.7 ' The court reasoned that to recover against a water company for misfeasance or
nonfeasance, the plaintiff must establish a contractual, statutory
or common law duty to provide water.7 5 The court recognized
that if liability was imposed on water companies, regardless of
the company's size, the cost of providing water would be increased.7" The court also noted that abolishing tort immunity for
water companies would open the floodgates to potentially limitless litigation. 77 The court declined, without a legislative directive to the contrary, to abrogate the immunity doctrine.71
72 Id. at 135-36, 87 A.2d at 325. Apparently, even with a special "boost" from
the fire equipment, the water pressure was inadequate to combat the fire. Id.
73 Id., 87 A.2d at 325-26. The first count alleged nonfeasance, in that the defendant failed to provide the reasonable volume of water that the plaintiff and
township believed it would. Id. at 136, 87 A.2d at 326. The second count asserted
misfeasance, as the water company allowed two hours to pass before acting on information that there was insufficient volume and water pressure to extinguish the
fire. Id. at 137, 87 A.2d at 326. The third count repeated the allegations of misfeasance and nonfeasance and alleged damages in business losses. Id. Plaintiff urged
that the defendant "exercised exclusive control over the fire hydrants and the exclusive function of furnishing water .. for inhabitants and the property owners of
the township and for the fire department." Id., 87 A.2d at 325-26. Plaintiff also
alleged that the defendant had knowledge of his building and business. Id.
74 Id. at 135, 140, 87 A.2d at 325, 327-28. The court noted that Baum, the controlling case in New Jersey for the past forty years, had "never been attacked or
weakened." 1d. at 139, 87 A.2d at 327. The supreme court affirmed the trial
court's grant of defendant's motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action.
Id. at 135, 87 A.2d at 325. For a discussion of Baum, see supra notes 56-64 and

accompanying text.
75, Id. at 137, 87 A.2d at 326. The court observed that in the case at bar there
was no contract or relevant statute. Id. It also noted that faced with a similar factual scenario, the New Jersey Court of Errors and Appeals had held in Baum that the
common law did not impose a duty on a public Utility supplying a municipality with
water to provide sufficient water to extinguish fires. Id. at 137-38, 87 A.2d at 326.
76 See id. at 139, 87 A.2d at 327.
77 Id. The court asserted: "If such a broad liability as that sought by the plaintiff
were established, the ensuing litigation would doubtless be great." Id.
71 See id. at 140, 87 A.2d at 327. [he court stated:
We conclude that if our law is to be overturned, the result should
be effected by the Legislature, vested with the law-making power. Statutory changes are accompanied by publicity and on opportunity for all
interested persons to be heard: incidents which are quite impossible in a
suit between parties.
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In a dissenting opinion, Justice Vanderbilt observed that a
public utility "enjoys extensive privileges by reason of the
franchise granted it by the State. '77 Therefore, the Justice declared that in return for these privileges, a water company should
be deemed to assume "a concomitant duty to the public" to provide water at sufficient quantity and pressure for ordinary use,
including firefighting."' Justice Vanderbilt contended that even
in the absence of an express contract, a water company should
not be immunized from liability for failure to supply water at sufficient pressure for extinguishing fires.8
Thirty-five years after Reimann, the New Jersey Supreme
Court abrogated the common law immunity for private water
companies in Weinberg v. Dinger.Y The court held that a property
owner could sue a private water company in tort for injuries sustained, to the extent that such losses were uninsured or underinsured for negligent failure to supply sufficient water to combat
fire."3 In so doing, the Weinberg majority overturned Reimann and
its progeny. 4
79 Id. at 141, 87 A.2d at 328 (Vanderbilt, C.J., dissenting).

Id.
8i Id. at 148, 87 A.2d at 332 (Vanderbilt, C.J., dissenting). The Chief Justice
stated:
There is no sound reason why a water company should be in a preferred
position of immunity on the theory that it is merely the supplier of a
commodity and therefore not liable in the absence of an express contract for a failure to supply water at a pressure sufficient for ordinary fire
extinguishment purposes. If the plaintiff can prove the allegations of his
complaint that the defendant knowingly reduced the water pressure to a
point where it knew or had reason to know that it would not be sufficient
to fight a fire, he should be permitted to recover because of the defendant's misfeasance or active wrongdoing. It is significant that the question of liability for misfeasance or active wrongdoing was not passed
upon in any of the decisions relied upon by the majority.
Id.
82 Weinbeig, 106 N.J. at 492, 524 A.2d at 378.
83 Id. The court determined:
[Wie abrogate the water company's immunity for losses caused by the
80

negligent failure to maintain adequate water pressure for fire fighting

only to the extent of claims that are uninsured or underinsured. To the
extent that such claims are insured and thereby assigned to the insurance carrier as required by statute, we hold that the carrier's subrogation claims are unenforceable against the water company.
Id. at 492-93, 524 A.2d at 378 (citation and footnote omitted).
84 See id. at 496, 524 A.2d at 380. "[Wle impose on private companies the duty
to act with reasonable care in providing water for extinguishing fires, and overrule

Reimaun v. Monmouth Consolidated Water Co. and cases decided in reliance on it." Id.
at 495, 524 A.2d at 380. Since Reiniann, the New Jersey Supreme Court asserted

that it had narrowed or abrogated several common law tort immunities. Id. at 485,
524 A.2d at 374 (citing Foldi v. Jeffries, 93 N.J. 533, 461 A.2d 1145 (1983) (narrow-
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Justice Stein, writing for the majority, began by noting that a
water company's duty to provide adequate water for fire fighting
may be derived from three distinct sources-contract, statute or
common law.8 5 The court asserted that under the majority rule,
absent express contractual or statutory provisions, a water company has no duty to furnish a sufficient supply of water for extinguishing fires."' It observed that decisions applying the majority
rule, however, were "frequently conclusory." 8 7
The supreme court observed that a minority of states recognize a cause of action against water companies for failure to supply sufficient water pressure for fighting fires. 8 In these cases,
ing parental immunity); Merenoff v.Merenoff, 76 N.J. 535, 388 A.2d 951 (1978)
(limiting interspousal immunity); Willis v. Department of Conservation & Economic Dev., 55 N.J. 534, 264 A.2d 34 (1970) (narrowing sovereign immunity); Collopy v. Newark Eye & Ear Infirmary, 27 N.J. 29, 141 A.2d 276 (1958) (limiting
charitable immunity)).
85 Id. at 474, 524 A.2d at 368 (citing Reimann v. Monmouth Consol. Water Co.,
9 N.J. 134, 137, 87 A.2d 325, 326 (1952)).
86 Id. at 479, 524 A.2d at 371 (citing German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Home Supply
Water Co., 226 U.S. 220 (1912); Luis v. Orcutt Town Water Co., 204 Cal. App.2d
433, 22 Cal. Rptr. 389 (1962); Earl E. Roher Transfer & Storage Co., Inc. v. Hutchinson Water Co., Inc., 182 Kan. 546, 322 P.2d 810 (1958); Gatewood v. Detroit
Water Dep't, 121 Mich. App. 57, 329 N.W.2d 34 (1982); Clark v. Meigs Equip. Co.,
10 Ohio App.2d 157, 266 N.E.2d 791 (1967)). The supreme court stated that majority-rule decisions generally construe contracts for water service strictly and deny
recovery unless specific provisions regarding water pressure were incorporated into
the contract. Id.
87 Id. at 480, 524 A.2d at 372. The majority observed that "[s]ome courts insist
that the only possible source of a duty of care is contractual." Id. It further stated
that some courts hold that no tort liability can attach where there is no contract
imposing an obligation on the water company, as there can be no breach of a duty
owed. Id. at 480, 524 A.2d at 372 (quoting German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Home
Water Supply Co., 226 U.S. 220 (1912)). The court noted that other cases, relying
on the distinction between nonfeasance and misfeasance, hold that where a water
company did not expressly assume responsibility to supply water for fire fighting, it
owed no duty to a consumer. Id. at 481, 524 A.2d at 372.
88 Id. at 482, 524 A.2d at 372-73 (citing Harris v.Board of Water and Sewer
Comm'rs of Mobile, 294 Ala. 606, 320 So.2d 624 (1975) (liability based on thirdparty beneficiary status or tort); Veach v.Phoenix, 102 Ariz. 195, 427 P.2d 335
(1967) (municipality liable in tort for breach of duty to provide water for fire protection); Woodbury v. Tampa Water Works Co., 57 Fla. 243, 49 So. 556 (1909)
(water company liability grounded in tort); Pineville Water Co., Inc. v. Bradshaw,
266 S.W.2d 305 (Ky. 1953) (recovery against water company based on theory of
third-party beneficiary); Potter v. Carolina Water Co., 253 N.C. 112, 116 S.E.2d
374 (1960) (third-party beneficiary recovers against water company); Doyle v.
South Pittsburgh Water Co., 414 Pa. 199, 199 A.2d 875 (1964) (recognizing valid
cause of action in tort against a water company); White v. Tennessee-American
Water Co., 603 S.W.2d 140 (Tenn. 1980) (water company held liable in tort); Shannon v. Grand Coulee, 7 Wash. App. 919, 503 P.2d 760 (Ct. App. 1972) (liability
predicated upon negligence)).
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the claim is upheld regardless of the existence of statutory or
contractual provisions with respect to water pressure. 9 The minority rule jurisdictions base liability on theories of third-party
contract beneficiaries or traditional tort doctrines:
The Weinberg court noted that although Weinberg and Penns
Grove had an express agreement incorporating water pressure
specifications, its decision would rest solely on tort law."' It
stated that the imposition of a duty "ultimately is a question of
fairness," which "involves a weighing of the relationship of the
parties, the nature of the risk, and the public interest in the proposed solution. ' '19 - The majority stressed that tort law requires
that persons wrongfully injured should be fairly compensated by
the tortfeasor responsible for their injuries.t 3
The majority first considered the public benefits that would
be derived from the imposition of a duty of care on water companies.' 4 The court asserted that requiring tortfeasors to pay for
the damages that they have caused provides an incentive for reasonable conductY' The majority also posited that "[b]y acting
non-negligently, water companies will decrease the risk of fire
damage and loss of life in ways property owners cannot, and, at
96
the same time, minimize their own exposure to tort liability."
Id. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
In the leading minority-rule case, Doyvle v.South Pittsburgh lIater Co., 414 Pa.
199, 199 A.2d 875 (1964), the court imposed a duty on a water company based on
the foreseeabilitv of the harm involved. See id. The Dole court stated:
The physical situation in the case at bar and the facts evolving
therefrom bring this litigation squarely within the rule that where a
party to a contract assumes a duty to the other party to the contract, and
it is foreseeable that a breach of that duty will cause injury to some third
person not a party to the contract, the contracting party owes a duty to
all those falling within the foreseeable orbit of risk of harm.
Id. at 207, 199 A.2d at 878 (citing MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382,
111 N.E. 1050 (1916)).
89

90 ll'ezberg, 106 N.J. at 482, 524 A.2d at 372-73. See supra note 88 and accompa-

nying text.
1)1Weinbesg, 106 N.J. at 483-84, 524 A.2d at 373. The court stated: "Although
the agreement and the regulation it adopts could serve as an independent basis for
the water company's liability, we choose to rely primarily on settled principles of
tort law as the bases for our decision." Id.
92 Id. at 485, 524 A.2d at 374 (quoting Goldberg v. Housing Auth., 38 N.J. 578,
186 A.2d 291 (1962)).
93 Id. at 486-87, 524 A.2d at 375 (quoting People Express Airlines, Inc. v.Consolidated Rail, 100 N.J. 246, 255, 495 A.2d 107, 111 (1985)).
94 See id. at 486-87, 524 A.2d at 375.
'5. Id. at 487, 524 A.2d at 375.
!) Id. The court noted: "Since the applicable standard of liability is negligence,
and not liability without fault, a water company that exercises due care will not be
liable in tort." Id.
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The court rejected the argument that as property owners are
ordinarily insured against fire loss, a rule imposing liability on
water companies would inure only to the benefit of insurance
companies whose subrogation rights would allow them to recover from water companies the moneys paid to property owners
under their insurance policies.
The majority emphasized that
the risks of loss covered by property insurance were "narrower
than those that a water company's exposure to liability would encompass.""' The court noted that insufficient water for fire fighting may result in loss of life, as well as loss of property:""
Moreover, the majority asserted that the abrogation of a water
company's immunity did not dictate imposition of liability in
favor of insurance carriers on subrogation claims."'o It explained
that subrogation is an equitable doctrine which is not applied as a
matter of right.""'
The majority was not persuaded by the concern that ultimately the consumer would have to bear the cost of water companies' additional insurance costs.112 The court also was not
convinced that elimination of water company immunity would
cause "shrinkage of the casualty insurance market" and increase
casualty insurance premiums.'"" The court observed that in jurisdictions that have imposed liability on water companies, resulting claims have not been substantial." 4 It further noted that
water companies in such jurisdictions were able to satisfy their
obligations to claimants by insurance, self-insurance or reserve
97

Id.

98 Id.
99 Id. (citing Reimann v. Monmouth Consol. Water Co., 9 N.J. 134, 149, 87 A.2d

325, 332 (1952) (Vanderbilt, C.J., dissenting)).
100 Id. at 489, 524 A.2d at 376. The court noted that subrogation clauses that
assign to the insurer the insured's claims against a third-party tortfeasor are statutorily authorized. Id. (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:36-5.20 (West 1985)). The cited
statutes provides in relevant part:
Every ...

fire insurance policy shall contain certain standard provi-

sions which shall be in the words . .. hereinafter set forth:
[he Company may require from the insured an assignment of all
right of recovery against any party for loss to the extent that payment
therefor is made by this Company.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:36-5.20 (West 1985).
'01
ll'einberg 106 N.J. at 489, 524 A.2d at 377-78.
102 See id., 524 A.2d at 375-76.
103 Id. at 487-88, 524 A.2d at 376. The court stated that "the rate escalation
prevalent in the insurance industry has already caused water companies in New
Jersey and elsewhere to experience a sharp increase in premiums and reduction in
coverage, independent of any impact our decision in this matter may have." Id.
104 1,1.
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funds. 105
The majority held that a private water company is liable for
negligent failure to provide sufficient water pressure for fighting
fires to the extent that such claims are under-insured or uninsured."'1 It stressed, however, that its decision "is made without
prejudice to the right of a subrogation claimant... to offer proof
tending to demonstrate that any increase in water rates resulting
from liability for subrogation claims would be substantially offset
by reductions in fire-insurance premiums. ' ' 10 7 The court stated
that it would reconsider its denial of insurance carriers' subrogation claims if such a correlation was established.'"'
The majority rejected the argument that imposing liability
on water companies would expose them to unlimited suits.'09
The court reasoned that "judicial obstruction of a fairly
grounded claim for redress" was not proper; rather the answer
lies in a "more sedulous application of traditional concepts of
duty and proximate causation to the facts of each case."' to The
majority emphasized that reasonable care is the appropriate stanId. at 488-89, 524 A.2d at 376.
106 Id. at 492, 524 A.2d at 378. The court stated:
105

[W]e abrogate the water company's immunity for losses caused by the
negligent failure to maintain adequate water pressure for fire fighting
only to the extent of claims that are uninsured or underinsured. To the
extent that such claims are insured and thereby assigned to the insurance carrier as required by statute, N.J.S.A. 17:36-5.20, we hold that the
carrier's subrogation claims are unenforceable against the water
company.
Id. at 492-93, 524 A.2d at 378 (footnote omitted). See supra note 100 and accompanying text,
107 Id. at 493, 524 A.2d at 378. Justice Stein explained the exclusion of subrogation claims from liability because it "would inevitably result in higher water rates"
paid by customers, and thus shift the risk of liability from the fire-insurance company to the customer. Id. at 492, 524 A.2d at 378. In effect, the customer, the
justice observed, would pay twice in its property insurance premiums and in higher
water rates to pay for liability insurance. Id. This result, Justice Stein maintained,
was contrary to public policy. Id.
108 Id., 524 A.2d at 378-79. The court stated:
If insurance rates were set on the basis of risk and experience, one
would expect a high correlation between the increase in water company
liability rates and the decrease in fire-insurance rates occasioned by the
abrogation of water company immunity in cases like this. If that correlation were to be proven in subsequent litigation, we would be prepared
to reconsider our denial of the carrier's right to subrogation against a
water company.

Id.
109 Id. at 493-94, 524 A.2d at 379.
110 Id. (citing People Express Airlines, Inc. v. Consolidated Rail, 100 N.J. 246,
254, 495 A.2d 107, 111 (1985)).
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dard to be applied to all suits. I '
Finally, the court observed that the immunity previously afforded private water companies was an "anomaly of [judicial]
creation."' 12 As such, the Weinberg court noted that the judiciary
was responsible for its elimination.' ' : The court explained that
when a principle of law fails to serve justice, it should be discarded by the same branch of government that introduced it into
the system.' 14
Justice Handler filed a separate opinion concurring in part
and dissenting in part.' '" Justice Handler agreed with the majority's decision to abrogate water company immunity for negligent
failure to provide sufficient water pressure to extinguish fires.'"'
The justice, however, disagreed with the majority's decision to
limit recovery to underinsured or uninsured victims.'"
He
stressed the importance of "principled, consistent rules, applied
uniformly," and posited that liability for negligence should attach
regardless of whether the claimant is an insurance carrier. 11
The justice concluded that as the record before the court was
insufficient regarding the consequences of total abrogation of
tort immunity, the court should have imposed liability broadly,
and allowed the legislature to reimpose immunity for societal interests if later required.'
See id.
Id. at 495, 524 A.2d at 380.
1 3I'Id. The court noted that although only a minority ofjurisdictions had abro-

I I

112

gated water company immunity, it was proper. Id. at 494, 524 A.2d at 379. It observed that application of the immunity doctrine in New Jersey was largely
attributable to s/are derisis. Id. at 494-95, 524 A.2d at 379.
114 Id. at 495, 524 A.2d at 380 (quoting Collopy v. Newark Eye & Ear Infirmary,
27 N.J. 29, 47-48, 141 A.2d 276, 287 (1958)).
1'5 Id. at 496, 524 A.2d at 380 (Handler, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
1II6 Id.
1'' Id.

I Is Id. at 497, 524 A.2d at 381 (Handler, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). Justice Handler stated: "The judicial role in cases such as this one is to
cleanse the tort system of its irrational and anomalous elements." Id.
I l,) Id. Thejustice asserted:
The principle against immunity from tort liability should, for the
moment, stand. The legislature is the proper forum for determining
whether societal interests require a reimposition, in whole or in part, of
the water companies immunity, and if there is to be partial or limited
immunity, whether that should be achieved directly, or indirectly by
modifying the insurance laws. There is no reason to believe that the
legislature will not act if such action is warranted.
Id. at 497-98, 524 A.2d at 381 (citation omitted) (Handler, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
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In her dissenting opinion, Justice Garibaldi asserted that the
majority's decision is contrary to legislative policies concerning
regulation and immunity of private water companies.' 2 She posited that the legislature's failure to act, despite a direct invitation
by the Reimann court, indicates its acceptance of the Reimann doctrine. 121 Justice Garibaldi noted that justice maintained that any
company immunity should have been
decision to abrogate water
122
made by the legislature.
Justice Garibaldi also supported the BPU's argument in support of the Reimann doctrine which urged that the imposition of
liability "could easily precipitate an insurance crisis in the water
industry."'"" Thejustice asserted that given the BPU's eXpertise,
the court should have accepted its recommendation.1 4 She
stated that there was no evidence to support the majority's assumption that these adverse economic consequences could be
12 5
avoided simply by disallowing subrogation claims.
Justice Garibaldi asserted that the majority's decision concerning subrogated claims was erroneous. 126 She asserted that
the determination conflicted with the statutory provisions which
specifically granted subrogation rights to insurance companies.' 27 The justice further opined that the determination precluding subrogation claims was not decided on a sufficient record
because this was not a subrogation matter nor were insurance
companies involved. '2 ' Finally, Justice Garibaldi citing the high
120 Id. at 498-503, 524 A.2d at 381-84 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting). See Foldi v. Jeffries, 93 N.J. 533, 545, 461 A.2d 1145, 1151 (1983) (Justice Garibaldi stating that
the court is free to intervene concerning parental immunity where the legislature
has not yet acted).
121 Weinberg, 106 N.J. at 499, 524 A.2d at 382 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting).
122 Id. at 499, 524 A.2d at 381 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting). Justice Garibaldi
asserted:
The sweeping policy change effected by the majority's no immunity/no subrogation scheme-a change that affects a basic service to so
many consumers-should be made by the Legislature based on information and forecasts supplied by the BPU and the Commissioner of Insurance. It should not be based upon judicial speculation. Most certainly
this Court should not decree such a change in contravention of the express position of the governmental agency charged with regulating the
industry.
Id.
123 Id. at 500-02, 524 A.2d at 382-83 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting).
124 Id. at 502, 524 A.2d at 383 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting).
125 Id. at 498, 524 A.2d at 381 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting).
126 Id. at 503-05, 524 A.2d at 384-85 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting).
127 Id. at 503-04, 524 A.2d at 384 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting). See supra note 100
and accompanying text.
128 See I1einberg, 106 N.J. at 505, 524 A.2d at 385 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting).
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cost of insurance, disagreed with the majority that the subroga2'
tion doctrine would reduce the costs borne by the consumer. )
The justice concluded that as most property owners carry
adequate fire insurance, abolition of the immunity was unnecessary and inefficient.'
Justice Garibaldi asserted that only those
who were uninsured or underinsured would benefit from the majority's decision.''
She opined that a rule which benefits few,
and has burdensome consequences on most consumers, was
unjustified.'3
As time-honored immunities are slowly being eradicated
from an ever-changing society,13 3 there is a constant battle beId. at 505-06, 524 A.2d at 385 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting). Justice Garibaldi
stated:
With or without subrogation, water companies will need new liability insurance policies to cover claims by underinsured or uninsured
property owners. It is simply unreasonable in this time of reduced insurance availability and escalated premiums to assume that this insurance will not be costly, particularly in light of the fact that water
companies have no way of knowing which properties within the zone of
danger-residential or commercial, within or without their service areas-are fully insured for fire loss; which are insured only for the structure and not the contents; and which are underinsured for the structure
and/or the contents.
Id. at 506, 524 A.2d at 385 (footnote omitted) (Garibaldi, J., dissenting).
130 Id. at 506, 524 A.2d at 385 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting).
1'3 Id. at 507, 524 A.2d at 486 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting). Justice Garibaldi
observed:
As the majority acknowledges, most of the people who will be injured by the water company's negligence already have fire insurance
protection and will continue to insure their property adequately against
the risk of fire damage regardless of today's decision. For these people,
the abolition of immunity is unnecessary. Recovery for these owners
under their fire insurance policy is a more reliable compensation mechanism than litigation seeking recovery for negligence. In short, for these
insured property owners-and for tenants who have comprehensive
property protection insurance-the only likely result is higher water
rates. For these consumers, abandoning the immunity rule is not only
inefficient, it is also unfair.
Id. at 506, 524 A.2d at 385 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting).
132 Id. at 507-08, 524 A.2d at 386 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting). Justice Garibaldi
concluded:
12,.

In sum, the new rules benefit few. Granted there are some unin-

sured or underinsured persons whose property will be damaged and
some persons who will be personally injured as the result of negligence
of the water company that will receive reimbursement they presently are
not entitled to receive. Nevertheless, to compensate these few, I believe
that the vast majority of water consumers will pay higher utility rates.
Id. at 507, 524 A.2d at 386 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting).
I33 See supra note I and accompanying text.

972

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 18:955

tween the judiciary and the legislature.' 4 Each branch is responsible for shaping laws in accordance with the demands of
society," 5 and each has a duty to reconsider outdated doc. The legislature's failure to act, however, does not protrines. 136
vide adequate justification for the court to relinquish its
obligations to review outmoded doctrines.
The Weinberg decision is incompatible with existing statutory
provisions. 3 7 Instead of protecting the express statutory rights
of insurance carriers, the court advanced only the interests of culpable water companies. 13 Surely, no one will benefit from barring an innocent carrier from recovering compensation from a
third-party wrongdoer.
Another criticism of the Weinberg decision relates to the majority's belief that imposing liability on a water company will act
as a deterrent against negligent conduct. Water companies in
New Jersey, which are regulated by the BPU, are required to provide sufficient water pressure."": In light of the BPU provision,
there is no need to hold water companies civilly liable.' 4"
Compliance with the guidelines set forth by the BPU necessarily requires water companies to act reasonably.' 4 ' As water
companies are already compelled by the BPU to act reasonably,
imposition of liability by the courts will not result in additional
safeguards. 4 ' Both the Weinberg court and the BPU impose the
same duty of care on the water companies, the difference is that
breach of the BPU standard results in a misdemeanor,14 3 whereas
the breach under the Weinberg doctrine results in civil liability.
The Weinberg holding also requires water companies to obtain additional insurance coverage. Thus, it is arguable that the majority could have employed a more efficacious means of attaining
134

See supra notes 1 & 6 and accompanying text.

135 See Collopy v. Newark Eye & Ear Infirmary, 27 N.J. 29, 47, 141 A.2d 276, 287

(1958).
'3 See Brief of Public Advocate at 8, Weinberg v. Dinger, 106 N.J. 369, 524 A.2d
355 (1987) (No. A-I).
1'7 See 1l'einberg, 106 N.J. at 503, 524 A.2d at 384 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting).
138 See id. at 504, 524 A.2d at 384 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting).
139 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 48:2-13 (West Supp. 1972). "The board shall have general supervision and regulation of and jurisdiction and control over all public utilities . . . . '"Id. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
140 See Brief of Amicus Curiae Board of Public Utilities at 10, Weinberg v. Dinger,
106 N.J. 469, 524 A.2d 355 (1987) (No. A-I).
141 See supra note 14 & 69 and accompanying text.
142 See Brief of Amicus Curiae Board of Public Utilities at 10, Weinberg v. Dinger,
106 NJ. 469, 524 A.2d 355 (1987) (No. A-I).
143 See spra note 69 and accompanying text.
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responsible44 management
than
through
abrogation
of
immunity. 1
Perhaps. the most disturbing facet of the Weinberg decision is
the fact that all parties involved in the litigation lost to some extent. The majority failed to recognize that in rejecting subroga45
tion claims, the true purpose of tort law would be thwarted.'
Redress for wrongful injuries is not recoverable against water
companies in most instances.
Ultimately, most claimants will
have to seek compensation from their own carriers, and not the
tortfeasor's carrier. 14 7 Likewise, fire insurance carriers lost their
statutory right to assert third-party subrogation claims against
water companies. 14 1 Carriers, liable to policyholders for fire
14 9
losses, are precluded from recouping moneys paid.
Ironically, in an effort to protect the public, the court has
subjected consumers to increased water rates. As a result of the
Weinberg decision, water companies will be forced to obtain insurance policies to cover potential losses. Because of the high cost
of such policies, operating costs will skyrocket."1
The ramifications of the Weinberg decision have yet to be fully
realized. While the court may have usurped legislative power,
the decision does not foreclose the legislature from reinstating
water company immunity through statutory enactments.' ' In
any event, the court's intentions are clear. It will continue to chip
away at the vestiges of the immunity doctrine when given the opportunity to do so. At least for now, private water companies
144 See Brief of Amicus Curiae Board of Public Utilities at 12, Weinberg v. Dinger,
106 N.J. 469, 524 A.2d 366 (1987) (No. A-I).
145 See Wleinbeg, 106 N.J. at 506-07, 524 A.2d at 385 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting).
146 See id. See also supra notes 130 & 131 and accompanying text.
147 lleinbeg, 106 N.J. at 506-07, 524 A.2d at 385 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting). See
also supa notes 130 & 131 and accompanying text.
148 Weinberg. 106 N.J. at 504, 524 A.2d at 384 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting).
149 Id.
150 Id. at 498, 524 A.2d at 381 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting). Justice Garibaldi asserted that consumers would have to pay twice-first for property insurance premiums, and then in the form of increased water rates to absorb the cost of the water
company's liability insurance. Id.
151 In July 1987, the BPU submitted a tentative legislative draft to the Chief
Counsel of Governor Thomas Kean. The purpose of the draft was to reinstate the
water company immunitv. On the Chief Counsel's approval, the draft will become
an administration bill, subject to the legislature's ratification. Should the legislature decide to ratify the bill, the water company immunity doctrine will be reinstated. Telephone interview with Page Berry, Assistant Director, Board of Public
Utilities, Newark, NewJersey (August 20, 1987). As of the date of this note's publication, there has been no other legislative action.
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must adequately insure themselves against risk of loss for failure
to supply sufficient water pressure for extinguishing fires.
Manna C. Perna

